The prime minister is fully within his constitutional
rights to reshuffle Cabinet, getting rid of those whom he thinks are not loyal
to him and packing the Cabinet with a new line-up of faithful supporters.
But for him to say that he had to take this action
because they contradicted the concept of collective responsibility shows a lack
of understanding of this important democratic convention.
The purpose of this article is three-fold.
First it demonstrates that the concept of collective
responsibility refers to public criticism of government policy and cannot be
used to condone any wrong-doings of individual ministers.
Second, it is the prime minister who is responsible
for taking action that has had the effect of contradicting the concept of
collective responsibility.
Third, for the concept of collective responsibility to
work effectively, members of Parliament, both from the opposition and from the
ruling coalition, need to act like parliamentarians rather than representatives
of their political parties.
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility, whether
collective or individual, expresses the conventional relationship of minsters
to Parliament.
For the doctrine to work properly, it requires that
all ministers be jointly responsible as a team.
This means that individual ministers may not in public
express views that contradict public policy.
Since the ministers who have been sacked did not
openly criticise the policies of the government, they cannot be said to have
contravened the doctrine of collective responsibility.
Collective responsibility does not mean that ministers
must condone the personal misconduct of their fellow ministers. Indeed, they
have a moral duty to protect the integrity of the government.
A prime minister who does not take action against a
colleague who has been found to have committed a serious personal offence, runs
the risk of having his whole government fall.
But what happens when it is the prime minister that
does not resign even though he is directly involved in a financial scandal?
In such a situation individual ministers or the
cabinet as a whole may revolt against the prime minister.
If this fails to bring about his resignation, the
matter will be brought up in parliament where it is likely to result in a vote
of no-confidence against the prime minister.
The fact that the Cabinet has not taken action to
censure the prime minister is an indication of the extent to which money
politics has seeped into the political system.
Although the prime minister accused his deputy of
bringing about a negative public perception of the government, it cannot be
denied that this negative public perception was already there before the deputy
intervened and it is likely to increase with the deputy’s dismissal.
Second, if anyone should take the responsibility for
contradicting the concept of collective responsibility, it is the prime
minister himself.
Although the prime minister does have the prerogative
of choosing his Cabinet, the fact that he chose to appoint the chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to be a
deputy minister shows his complete disregard for the concept of collective
responsibility.
For this committee is most closely identified with the
function of securing government accountability to Parliament.
The work of this committee is based on the principle
that parliament grants money to the government to carry out certain expenditures
and holds the ministers accountable for the proper use of this money.
It is directly involved in the task of holding
government accountable for the way it has spent public money.
Our Parliament's PAC was in the midst of carrying out
this important function when the prime minister appointed the chairman and
three other members of the PAC to Cabinet positions.
Clearly, the move has had the effect of reducing the
effectiveness of the PAC and indirectly preventing Parliament from carrying out
its important function of holding government accountable.
This, together with the sudden removal of the Attorney-General from office, has had the
effect of weakening Parliament and jeopardising the concept of collective
responsibility.
In Britain and other parliamentary democracies, the
chairman of the PAC is, by convention, drawn from the opposition and the
committee consists of equal number of MPs from each side of the House.
This reduces the chances of pressures from the
government to influence the outcome. In Malaysia the fact that the prime
minister also heads the Ministry of Finance and, further is also head of a
department with diverse functions and has nearly one-third of the ministers
working directly under him – a kind of cabinet within a cabinet – makes him the
most powerful prime minister in the world.
The convention that the prime minister’s status is one
of “primus inter pares” (first among equals) simply does not apply in Malaysia.
Third, paradoxically the principle of collective
responsibility can also act as a shield to protect the government against
parliamentary scrutiny.
This is particularly the case when backbenchers in
Parliament are prevented from making their own decisions because of a strong
party discipline.
In such a situation Parliament and the public are
presented with the appearance of a united front that is impenetrable. For
collective responsibility to work properly, it is important that backbenchers
are given a degree of freedom to exercise their responsibilities as
parliamentarians and not just as party members.
This is important because in a parliamentary system,
the majority of members of Parliament come from the ruling party.
If the assertion of accountability is exclusively a
function of the opposition, we could not properly speak of ministerial
responsibility to Parliament.
The maintenance of an effective responsibility to
parliament depends not only on the opposition but also on the willingness of
backbenchers to play their role as parliamentarians.
The tendency in Malaysia is for the party whip to come
down hard on backbenchers who may wish to query any aspect of government
policy.
This practice has the effect of reducing the status of
parliament to a rubber stamp of the government.
Yet the role of the backbenchers can be crucial,
especially in times of crisis such as what Malaysia is facing today.
It is when dissatisfaction among the government’s own
backbenchers threatens to break out in open revolt that the government is most
responsive to parliamentary pressure.
In many developed democracies, the concept of
collective responsibility is regarded something which has its uses but which
can also be inimical to good government.
It is recognised that the best decisions are made in
an atmosphere of transparency and open debate and this has led to a more
tolerant view of public dissension within the government.
Ministers seem to be given a greater degree of freedom
to express views that are contrary to the official view without having to
resign or be dismissed.
In Malaysia we have lost out on both counts. A strong
party ensures that MPs toe the party line to the extent that parliament cannot
carry out its function to hold government accountable in any meaningful way,
and ministers are prevented from speaking openly against wrong-doings in the
government because if they do, they risk being sacked by the prime minister.
As backbenchers fail to see their role as
parliamentarians and become lackeys of their party bosses, the concept of
collective responsibility becomes little more than a myth to be used by
politicians to justify whatever action they choose to take. – July 30, 2015.
* The writer is a former associate professor in the
Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya.
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